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Abstract
A new class of multi-player competitive stochastic games in discrete-time with an affine
specification of the redistribution of payoffs at exercise is proposed and examined. Our games
cover as a very special case the classic two-person stochastic stopping games introduced by
Dynkin [4]. We first extend to the case of a single-period deterministic affine game the results
from Guo and Rutkowski [8, 9] where a particular subclass of competitive stopping games was
studied. We identify conditions under which optimal equilibria and value for a multi-player
competitive game with affine redistribution of payoffs exist. We also examine stochastic multi-
period affine games and we show that, under mild assumptions, they can be solved by the
backward induction.
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2 Stochastic Multi-Player Competitive Games
1 Introduction
The classic Dynkin game, introduced in the path-breaking paper [4], is a zero-sum, optimal stopping
game between two players where each player can stop the game for a payoff observable at that
time. They were the object of several papers published during the last forty years; see, for instance,
[2, 13, 23, 24, 27, 30, 33]. The classic zero-sum two-player Dynkin games were also used to construct
and analyze the financial contracts dubbed the game options (also known as Israeli options). This
notion was formally defined by Kifer [21], who proved the existence and uniqueness for the arbitrage
price of a game option in some benchmark financial models. For an exhaustive overview of results on
two-player Dynkin games and Israeli options, the interested reader is referred to the recent survey by
Kifer [22]. Several alternative formulations of extended Dynkin games with more than two players
can be found in the existing literature (see [11, 12, 18, 31, 32]). For instance, Solan and Vieille [31]
introduced a multi-player quitting game, which terminates as soon as any player chooses to quit;
then each player receives a payoff depending on the set of players quitting the game. Under certain
payoff conditions, a subgame perfect uniform ǫ-equilibrium using cyclic strategies can be found.
Another version of a multi-player Dynkin was examined in Solan and Vieille [32] where players are
given the opportunity to stop the game in a turn-based fashion. A subgame perfect ǫ-equilibrium
was once again shown to exist and consist of pure strategies when the game is non-degenerate.
More recently, Guo and Rutkowski [8, 9] introduced a class of m-player stopping games (dubbed
the redistribution games) with a focus on designing the explicit dependencies between the payoffs
of all players and their stopping decisions. The goal was to model a multilateral contract where all
players are competing for a predetermined (albeit possibly random) total wealth. Each player can
either exit (and thus also terminate) the contract for a predetermined benefit, or do nothing and
receive an adjusted benefit, which reflects the discrepancies caused by any exiting decisions of other
players. These adjustments were judiciously designed to ensure that the total wealth redistributed
was fixed.
In the present work, we first generalize results from [8, 9] to the case of a single-period deter-
ministic affine game. It should be stressed that in a multi-period framework, stochastic multi-player
competitive games with an affine redistribution of payoffs are defined in a recursive way. Specifically,
the payoffs redistribution at the moment when a game is first ‘stopped’ or ‘exercised’ at time t by
one of the players is based in the first place on the running payoffs for all players, but they also
take into account the values for exercising players of an equivalent game, which is not exercised at
time t, but instead it continues at least till time t + 1. The idea of the recursive specification of
the multi-player game is reminiscent of the concepts of exercise payoff and continuation value for
some financial derivatives, such as American or game options (see [17, 21, 22]), which indeed was
the original motivation for our research. It is worth stressing that the interpretation of a player’s
decision to ‘exercise’ depends on the context and, in practice, does not necessarily mean that a game
is actually stopped.
For instance, in our applications of results from this paper to multi-person financial contracts
with a fixed maturity date, by ‘exercising’ we mean a decision to ‘put’ a traded tranche of a contract
to the issuer. According to this interpretation, all tranches of a contract will be traded till the
contract’s maturity date, also in the case when some agents will decide to ‘exercise’ the contract
before its maturity. Hence we deal here with multi-player multi-exercise games, rather than typical
stopping games in which exercise payoffs do not depend on an optimal behavior of players in the
future. For applications of results from this work to arbitrage pricing of multi-person financial
contracts, the interested reader is referred to [10].
Let us only stress here that a financial derivative with meaningful decisions of counterparties
should not be confused with a ‘game’ in the usual sense of this term. Indeed, the standard rationale
that underpins the game theory is that players should search for their respective optimal strategies,
or at least for an equilibrium strategy profile for all players. By contrast, the valuation problem for
financial derivatives in an arbitrage-free market model hinges on the concept of replication (or super-
hedging) of a contract’s cash flows through the wealth process of a self-financing trading strategy.
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Therefore, an essential step in linking the arbitrage valuation problem for financial derivatives to the
equilibrium paradigm prevailing in game theory relies on showing that the arbitrage prices, if well-
defined, may be also interpreted as the values of a virtual game played by the counterparties under
the martingale measure, which stems from the so-called Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing. As
recently shown in [10], a necessary condition for a general multi-person game to be consistent with
arbitrage pricing theory is that the game admits an optimal equilibrium (as opposed to a weaker
notion of a Nash equilibrium) under the unique martingale measure in a complete and arbitrage-free
market model. For this reason, we aim to identify classes of multi-player competitive games for which
an optimal equilibrium exists. It was proven in [10] (see part (ii) in Theorem 4.2 and Proposition
4.3 therein) that the games considered in the present work are suitable models of multi-person game
options with unique arbitrage prices.
Furthermore, in financial applications, which indeed motivated our study of affine games, there
is no much sense to deal with mixed (i.e., randomised) strategies, since randomisation of strategies
would undermine the concepts of an arbitrage opportunity (i.e., a risk-free profit) and super-hedging
(i.e., a complete elimination of risk). Therefore, only pure strategies are considered in what follows.
To be more specific, although a strategy can be random, it will always be adapted to a given
reference filtration describing the information flow, so that no additional randomisation of a strategy
is allowed. For more details on methods of mathematical finance, the interested reader is referred
to, e.g., [15, 19, 25] and for a detailed study of connections between multi-player stochastic games
and multi-person game contingent claims, we refer to [10].
In the present work, we first identify conditions under which a deterministic single-period multi-
person affine game possesses an optimal equilibrium, so that the value for the game exists. As
explained above, the existence of an optimal equilibrium is a crucial property from the viewpoint of
arbitrage pricing theory. Next, we show that all single-period results can be immediately applied to
a stochastic extension where both terminal and exercise payoffs are random, as long as expectations
are incorporated into the definitions of a solution and an optimal equilibrium. Finally, we examine
the stochastic multi-period affine games and we show that they can be solved through the backward
induction under mild assumptions. These recursive games can be readily applied to multi-person
financial game options, where the properties of an optimal equilibrium become imperative in the
pricing arguments (see, in particular, Theorem 4.2 in [10]). Apart from multi-person game options,
the multi-player competitive games examined in this work may find applications in other economic
and financial contexts, for example, as a consumption model with bounded resources (see, e.g.,
Ramasubramanian [28, 29]). Continuous-time versions of affine games studied here are also of
interest and they will be studied elsewhere; see, e.g., Nie and Rutkowski [26] for continuous-time
redistribution games and the associated backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs).
This paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we first construct the single-period m-player affine game associated with a non-
singular matrix G. The role of G is to specify the redistribution of payoffs among non-exercising
players. We note that single-period affine games are also closely related to a well-known class of
optimisation problems, known as linear complementarity problems (LCPs). In fact, we show that
finding Nash equilibria in an affine game is equivalent to finding solutions to an associated LCP.
Using techniques from the theory of LCPs, we are able to identify sufficient conditions on the matrix
G that ensure the existence of Nash equilibria, optimal equilibria, individual values and coalition
values. The main result in Section 2 is Theorem 2.1, which shows that if G is a P-matrix (i.e., a
matrix with all principal minors positive), then the affine game has at least one Nash equilibrium
and all Nash equilibria attain the same payoff. Furthermore, if G is a K-matrix (i.e., a P-matrix with
non-positive off-diagonal terms), then the single-period affine game is weakly unilaterally competitive
(WUC) in the sense of Kats and Thisse [20], and the Nash equilibrium payoff is also the unique
value of the game.
In Section 3, we examine the class of affine games with singular matrices. Theorem 3.1 shows
that if G is a P†-matrix (i.e., a matrix with a non-negative determinant and positive proper prin-
cipal minors), then the affine game has a Nash equilibrium and a unique Nash equilibrium payoff.
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Moreover, when G is a K†-matrix (i.e., a P†-matrix with non-positive off-diagonal terms), then the
affine game is WUC and has a unique value. We also examine coalition values and we show in
Section 3.2 that the additivity property holds for a certain subclass of affine games.
In Section 4, we introduce stochastic multi-period m-player affine games and we show that they
can be solved by the backward induction. Results for single-period affine games, regarding the
existence of Nash equilibria, optimal equilibria, individual values and coalition values, are extended
to the class of stochastic multi-period affine games (see Theorem 4.1). We conclude by presenting
in Section 5 the reflected BSDE associated with the multi-period affine game. In the appendix, we
briefly revisit some of our previous results for redistribution games obtained in [9] and we show that
they can be recovered from results of this paper. We stress once again that we work throughout
with pure strategies only, as will be clear anyway from the definitions of a strategy profile and an
optimal equilibrium.
1.1 Motivation: Market Games and Game Options
Let us first provide a tentative economic rationale for the concept of an affine game. We stress once
again the we use the term ‘exercise’ to describe any essential decision of a player that affects other
individuals. Recall that in a multi-player redistribution game, introduced in Guo and Rutkowski
[9], the payoff discrepancies caused by the exercising players are treated as an aggregated total
before being redistributed into the payoffs of the remaining players. If we would like control the
redistribution on a more granular level, that is, to individually specify how the discrepancy of
each exercising player is redistributed, we must define a larger class of games. The class of affine
games introduced in the present work encompasses the class of redistribution games; their aim is
to describe the competition between players in a more flexible way than in [9]. Each affine game,
denoted hereafter by AG(X,P,G), is associated with some m × m matrix G, which effectively
replaces the redistribution quotients and the weights introduced in [8, 9]. The following basic
example illustrates an economic underpinning for the concept of a single-period deterministic game
with ‘affine redistribution of payoffs’, which, for the sake of brevity, is henceforth dubbed an affine
game. For the sake of concreteness, we discuss here a stylized market game between m competing
firms that need to make decisions about their respective business strategies. Needless to say that a
range of real-life situations to which our model can be applied is, of course, much broader.
The m firms are assumed to share the same market for a particular product or service and each
of them would like to maximize the value for shareholders, formally represented by the fundamental
value, denoted as Vi. Each firm i faces the choice between two business strategies:
(A) a safe strategy leading to a fixed value of Vi = Xi (e.g., by simply continuing its current contracts
with existing customers) or
(B) a risky strategy, which results in a yet unspecified variable value, denoted as Vi (e.g., by offering
innovative products in order to attract more customers), which will depend, in particular, on choices
made simultaneously by the other firms.
If all firms select option (B) then their forecasted values are given by some predetermined values,
denoted as P1, . . . , Pm. However, the scenario that all firms decide to choose (B) will not be an
optimal solution when there exists at least one firm for which Pi < Xi, since in that case it will be
clearly sub-optimal for this firm to choose (B) over (A). Let us denote by E the set of firms that
choose option (A). As already stated, for each firm i ∈ E , the value is fixed to be Vi = Xi and, by
convention, it is referred to as the exercise value. By contrast, for each firm j /∈ E , its value Vj should
be adjusted from the forecasted value Pj , so we need to specify how the discrepancy Vj −Pj should
be computed. In an affine game, this adjustment is assumed to depend linearly on the differences
Xi − Pi for all i ∈ E .
To explain intuitively the competitive nature of the market game, we consider a particular firm
i ∈ E and we show how that decision affects the market share for firm j /∈ E . Note that in this
step we assume that only firm i has chosen option (A), so that E = {i}. Out of the relative value
Xi − Pi > 0, which is gained by firm i by not selecting (B), a fixed fraction comes from another
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firm j. For concreteness, suppose that Gii > 0 is the profit per customer of firm i and −Gji > 0
is the profit per customer of firm j multiplied by the fraction of customers abandoning firm j and
moving to firm i, as a result of the decision of firm i to choose (A). Then the ratio of changes in
values between firms i and j is given by the ratio Gji/Gii < 0. The above considerations lead to
the following expression for the value of each firm j /∈ E
Vj = Pj +Gji
(
Gii
)−1(
Xi − Pi
)
< Pj . (1.1)
In this step, we have specified a matrix G describing the market relationships between m firms. It
is not yet clear, however, what will happen if more than one firm decides to adopt strategy (A)
We will now show how to deal with a general situation for any number of firms in the set E .
We now consider the vectors of values and we postulate that the vector V − P lies in the column
space of the sub-matrix G·E , which is obtained from G by taking columns with indices i ∈ E . This
assumption is a natural extension of expression (1.1) and, in fact, it can be shown to uniquely specify
the vector V of fundamental values for all firms. Indeed, by using the condition that Vi = Xi for all
i ∈ E and solving for V , we arrive at the following vector equation (see Lemma 2.1)
V = P +G·E
(
GEE
)−1(
XE − PE
)
.
This expression is exactly the payoff function of a single-period affine game, as will be formally intro-
duced in Definition 2.1 below. It is also consistent, as shown in the appendix, with the specification
of V for redistribution games studied in [8, 9] and in fact it allows for a more flexible (in some sense,
more firm-specific) schemes for redistribution of relative profits/losses. Let us finally observe that
the inequality Pi > Xi does not necessarily imply that firm i will choose (B) since, as a result of
adverse decisions of other firms sharing the same market, the value Vi may fall below Xi.
The next logical step is to extend a single-period affine game to a multi-period stochastic affine
game or SAG(X,G) (see Section 4). Similar to the multi-period redistribution game examined in [9],
a recursive formulation of the game appears to be natural. The intuition behind this specification is
perhaps best explained by expanding upon the single-period market game described above. Suppose
that the firms are playing the market game at time 0, but the forecasted value P is taken to be the
expected value if all firms choose (B) at time 0 and then an analogous game is played at time 1.
This in turn depends on the expected value from time 2 and so on. Even though the fundamental
value should be maximized at time 0 only, the market game now also depends on future scenarios
at times 1, 2, . . . , T and thus also on potential future decisions of all players. As a result, the game
will have the shape of a multi-period competitive game, as defined in Section 4.
A particularly appealing motivation for our study of multi-person competitive games comes from
the theory of arbitrage pricing of financial derivatives. As we argue in [10], for a large class of
multi-person financial contracts, the fair valuation can be formally reduced to finding an optimal
equilibrium of the corresponding multi-player game under a unique martingale measure for the
underlying market model. In particular, Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.3 in [10] demonstrate that
the games considered in the present work correspond to multi-person game options with unique
arbitrage prices given by expected payoffs under an optimal equilibrium. The interested reader is
referred to [10] for a thorough examination of the issue of arbitrage pricing of multi-person contracts,
not restricted to the special case of contracts with an affine structure.
2 Competitive Games with Nonsingular Matrices
We first examine the simplest case of a single-period deterministic game. Consider a game with m
players, enumerated by the indices 1, 2, . . . ,m. The set of all players is denoted byM. Let X ∈ Rm
be the exercise payoff and let P ∈ Rm be the terminal payoff. We denote by S = {0, 1}m the
class of strategy profiles where 0 (resp., 1) corresponds to exercise (resp., continue). We denote
by V (s) ∈ Rm the vector (all vectors are understood to be column vectors) of payoffs obtained by
players when a strategy profile s is carried out.
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To specify explicitly the vector of payoffs, we introduce a matrix G ∈ Rm×m, such that the ith
column of G is formally attached to player i. Let E(s) := {i ∈ M : si = 0} be the set of exercising
players. For any s ∈ S, let G·E(s) be the sub-matrix obtained from G by taking columns with
indices from E(s). We propose the following definition of a single-period m-player competitive game
with affine redistribution of payoffs, dubbed an affine game. It extends the concept of an m-player
redistribution game introduced and examined in [8, 9] (see Definition 2.1 in [8] or Definition 4 in [9]).
Let us stress that single-period affine games are merely building blocks for multi-period stochastic
affine games studied in Section 3.
Definition 2.1. Let X,P ∈ Rm be fixed vectors and G ∈ Rm×m be a matrix with a positive
diagonal and non-zero principal minors. An m-player affine game AG(X,P,G) is a single-period
deterministic game in which each player i can either choose to exercise (si = 0) or not exercise
(si = 1). For any strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ S, the payoff vector V (s) = (V1(s), . . . , Vm(s))
is given by
V (s) = P +G·E(s)
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s)) (2.1)
where E(s) = {i ∈M : si = 0} is the set of exercising players.
Let us make a comment on the difference between the class of redistribution games examined
in [8, 9] and a more general class of game with affine redistribution of payoffs. For concreteness,
let us assume that m = 5 and three players decide to exercise at time 0. Then, in a redistribution
game, the ‘losses’ of the two non-exercising players only depend on the aggregated ‘gain’ of exercising
players, whereas in a more general case of an affine game they may also depend on a distribution of
‘gains’ among three exercising players. Hence, using the concept of an affine game, we are able to
address with more precision and flexibility the individual relationships between non-exercising and
exercising players, and not only between cohorts of players.
To sum up, in an affine game the redistribution of losses among non-exercising players takes
into account the exact structure of gains made by exercising players, whereas in a redistribution
game only the total gain of exercising players matters. It is thus clear that the former set-up has the
ability to cover a wider spectrum of real-life applications. Other specifications of multi-person games
are also of interest. For instance, in [9] we examined the case of quitting games but, unfortunately,
the crucial requirement of the existence of an optimal equilibrium is typically not satisfied when a
quitting game is played in a stochastic environment.
From the mathematical perspective, it is interesting to note that formula (2.1) can be derived
by postulating that, for any strategy profile s ∈ S, the payoff deviation V (s)− P lies in the column
space of the matrix G·E(s). Formally, we postulate that the payoff function V : S → R
m satisfies
Vi(s) = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E(s),
V (s)− P = Ga(s), a(s) ∈ Rm,
ai(s) = 0, ∀ i /∈ E(s).
(2.2)
By scaling ai appropriately, we may and do assume, without loss of generality, that G has only
positive diagonal terms. The following lemma furnishes an explicit formula for the payoff function
V that satisfies conditions (2.2) for every strategy profile s ∈ S.
Lemma 2.1. Let G ∈ Rm×m be a matrix with a positive diagonal and non-zero principal minors.
Then the payoff function V can be written in terms of X,P and G as in (2.1).
Proof. The last two conditions in (2.2) imply that the payoff vector satisfies
V (s) = P +G·E(s)aE(s)(s)
where in aE(s)(s) we take terms with indices in E(s). From the first condition in (2.2), we obtain
Vi(s) = Xi for all i ∈ E(s) and thus
aE(s)(s) =
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE − PE)
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since the sub-matrix GE(s)E(s) is non-singular. We conclude that, for every strategy profile s ∈ S,
the payoff V (s) can be explicitly written as in (2.1).
In Guo and Rutkowski [9], we introduced the concept of the multi-player general redistribution
game. It was shown there that the payoff of the general redistribution game can be expressed in
terms of a suitable projection. A similar result will be established here for the m-player affine game.
To this end, we will need the following elementary lemma.
Lemma 2.2. Let π be the projection mapping induced by the inner product 〈·, ·〉 in Rm. Let x ∈ Rm
be any vector and K ⊆ Rm be any closed, convex set. Suppose that y ∈ K. Then y = πK(x) if and
only if 〈y − x, z − y〉 ≥ 0 for all z ∈ K.
Proposition 2.1. The payoff function V (s) satisfies V (s) ∈ HE(s) and(
G−1(V (s)− P )
)T
(y − V (s)) = 0, ∀ y ∈ HE(s), (2.3)
where HE(s) :=
{
x ∈ Rm : xi = Xi, ∀ i ∈ E(s)
}
. If G is a positive definite symmetric matrix, then
V (s) = πG
−1
HE(s)
(P ) (2.4)
where the projection πG
−1
HE(s)
: Rm → HE(s) is taken under the inner product 〈x, y〉
G−1 = xTG−1y.
Proof. In view of (2.2), condition (2.3) can be rewritten as
a(s)T(y − V (s)) = 0, ∀ y ∈ HE(s), (2.5)
where a(s) satisfies ai(s) = 0 for all i /∈ E(s). For all i ∈ E , yi − Vi(s) = Xi − Xi = 0. So (2.5)
clearly holds. If G is a positive definite symmetric matrix, then (2.4) follows immediately from the
property of projection given recalled in Lemma 2.2.
For the reader’s convenience, we recall the definition of Nash and optimal equilibria. Let Sk (resp.
S−k) be the strategy set for player k (resp. all other players). With a slight abuse of notation, we find
it convenient to represent an arbitrary strategy profile s as (sk, s−k) where sk ∈ Sk and s−k ∈ S−k.
Definition 2.2. (i) A strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ S is called a Nash equilibrium, or simply
an equilibrium, if no single player can improve her payoff by altering her own strategy, that is,
Vk(σ
k, σ−k) = sup
sk∈Sk
Vk(s
k, σ−k), ∀ k ∈ M. (2.6)
(ii) A Nash equilibrium σ = (σ1, . . . , σm) ∈ S is called an optimal equilibrium whenever
Vk(σ
k, σ−k) = inf
s−k∈S−k
Vk(σ
k, s−k), ∀ k ∈ M. (2.7)
(iii) The value V ∗ of the game is defined by
V ∗k = sup
sk∈Sk
inf
s−k∈S−k
Vk(s
k, s−k) = inf
s−k∈S−k
sup
sk∈Sk
Vk(s
k, s−k), ∀ k ∈ M, (2.8)
assuming the equality in (2.8) holds.
Remark 2.1. Equality (2.7) is equivalent to Vk(σ
k, σ−k) ≥ Vk(sk, σ−k) for all sk ∈ Sk. When
combined with condition (2.6) of a Nash equilibrium, an optimal equilibrium σ satisfies
Vk(σ
k, σ−k) = inf
s−k∈S−k
Vk(σ
k, s−k) = sup
sk∈Sk
Vk(s
k, σ−k), ∀ k ∈ M,
or, equivalently, for every k ∈ M,
Vk(σ
k, s−k) ≥ Vk(σ
k, σ−k) ≥ Vk(s
k, σ−k), ∀ sk ∈ Sk, ∀ s−k ∈ S−k.
It is easy to show that the existence of optimal equilibria implies the existence of the value. Moreover,
the payoff of any optimal equilibrium coincides with the value.
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The next natural step is to investigate the weakly unilaterally competitive (WUC) property intro-
duced by Kats and Thisse [20] and the existence of Nash and/or optimal equilibria in AG(X,P,G).
Specifically, we will address the following questions:
• Which choice of G ensures that AG(X,P,G) has the WUC property for all X and P?
• Which choice of G guarantees a Nash equilibrium in AG(X,P,G) for all X and P?
We will first attempt to gain some preliminary insight by analyzing the case where only one player
exercises. For the first question, recall from [20] that the WUC property requires that, for every
k, l ∈ M,
Vk(s
k, s−k) > Vk(σ
k, s−k) =⇒ Vl(s
k, s−k) ≤ Vl(σ
k, s−k),
Vk(s
k, s−k) = Vk(σ
k, s−k) =⇒ Vl(s
k, s−k) = Vl(σ
k, s−k),
for all sk, σk ∈ Sk and s−k ∈ S−k. Let us consider the strategy profiles s and s′ corresponding to
E(s) = ∅ and E(s′) = {k}. By applying the WUC property, we obtain, for all l 6= k,
Vk(s) > Vk(s
′) =⇒ Vl(s) ≤ Vl(s
′),
Vk(s) < Vk(s
′) =⇒ Vl(s) ≥ Vl(s
′),
Vk(s) = Vk(s
′) =⇒ Vl(s) = Vl(s
′).
It is also clear that V (s) = P and V (s′) = P +G·k(Gkk)
−1(Xk−Pk). Since Gkk > 0, it follows that
Glk ≤ 0 for all l 6= k and thus every off-diagonal term in G must be non-positive. This is simply a
necessary condition for the WUC property, and it is by no means a sufficient one. However, it does
motivate the choice of Z-matrices (see Definition 2.4).
For the second question, we once again consider the strategy profiles s and s′ corresponding to
E(s) = ∅ and E(s′) = {k}. If s′ is a Nash equilibrium, then
Xk = Vk(s
′) ≥ Vk(s) = Pk
and thus ak = (Gkk)
−1(Xk −Pk) ≥ 0. Furthermore, it is clear that Vi(s) ≥ Xi for all i ∈ M. When
we add these constraints to (2.2), it is clear that we are facing the problem that is reminiscent to
what is known as the linear complementarity problem.
2.1 Linear Complementarity Problems
We will now briefly review results for the linear complementarity problem, which will be used in
what follows. For more details, the reader is referred to the monographs by Cottle et al. [1] and
Facchinei and Pang [5].
Definition 2.3. Given q ∈ Rm and M ∈ Rm×m, the linear complementarity problem LCP(q,M) is
to search for a vector z ∈ Rm satisfying:
z ≥ 0,
q +Mz ≥ 0,
zT(q +Mz) = 0,
where the inequalities are taken component-wise.
Remark 2.2. It is common to denote w = q +Mz and equivalently state the problem as follows:
find vectors z, w ∈ Rm satisfying: 
w = q +Mz,
z ≥ 0, w ≥ 0,
zTw = 0.
(2.9)
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In the remainder of this paper, unless explicitly specified otherwise, we refer to the pair (z, w)
whenever a solution of LCP(q,M) is mentioned.
We will need the following definition, which is taken from Fiedler and Pta´k [6].
Definition 2.4. Let M be a real square matrix.
(i) If the principal minors of M are all positive, then it is a P-matrix.
(ii) If the off-diagonal terms of M are all non-positive, then it is a Z-matrix.
(iii) If M is both a P-matrix and a Z-matrix, then it is a K-matrix.
The next result shows that the existence and uniqueness result for the solution of the LCP(q,M)
holds wheneverM is a P-matrix. For the proof of Proposition 2.2, see Section 3.3 in Cottle et al. [1].
Proposition 2.2. The problem LCP(q,M) has a unique solution z ∈ Rm for all q ∈ Rm if and only
if M is a P-matrix.
Remark 2.3. It is worth noting that the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 2.2 may be
adapted to the linear complementarity problem in a general rectangular region. Specifically, given
l, u ∈ Rm and M ∈ Rm×m with li < ui for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, the problem{
w = q +Mz, l ≤ z ≤ u,
1{zi>li}1{wi>0} = 1{zi<ui}1{wi<0} = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
has a solution (z, w) ∈ Rm × Rm for all q ∈ Rm if and only if M is a P-matrix. Furthermore, the
bounds li and ui may be set to −∞ and ∞, respectively.
Remark 2.4. If we set w = V (s) − X, q = P − X, z = a(s) and M = G, then LCP(q,M)
resembles the system of equations associated with the affine game AG(X,P,G). It is still not clear,
however, whether a solution of LCP(q,M) necessarily corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the game
AG(X,P,G). This important issue will be addressed in Theorem 2.1 below.
The following result summarizes the well-known properties of a solution of LCP(q,M).
Proposition 2.3. Let us fix q ∈ Rm and M ∈ Rm×m. For any z ∈ Rm, let us set w = q +Mz.
(i) The following statements are equivalent:
(a) (z, w) is a solution to LCP(q,M),
(b) (z, w) satisfies z = πRm+ (z − w),
(c) (z, w) satisfies wT(y − z) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ Rm+ .
Here the projection π : Rm → Rm+ is under the Euclidean norm and R
m
+ = {x ∈ R
m : x ≥ 0}.
(ii) Let M be a positive definite symmetric matrix. If (z, w) is a solution to LCP(q,M), then
z = πMRm+ (−M
−1q), w = πM
−1
Rm+
(q), (2.10)
where the projections πM
Rm+
: Rm → Rm+ and π
M−1
Rm+
: Rm → Rm+ are taken under the inner products
〈x, y〉M = xTMy and 〈x, y〉M
−1
= xTM−1y, respectively.
2.2 Subgame and Value
As was already mentioned, in order for the game AG(X,P,G) to enjoy the WUC property, it is
necessary for the off-diagonal terms to have opposite signs to the diagonal terms in the respective
columns. The following result analyzes in more detail the connections between P-matrices (or K-
matrices) and the properties of the affine game AG(X,P,G).
Theorem 2.1. Suppose X,P ∈ Rm are arbitrary vectors and G ∈ Rm×m is a P-matrix. Then:
(i) The affine game AG(X,P,G) has at least one Nash equilibrium and all Nash equilibria of
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AG(X,P,G) attain the same payoff V ∗.
(ii) The Nash equilibrium payoff V ∗ satisfies(
G−1(V ∗ − P )
)T
(y − V ∗) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ O(X), (2.11)
where O(X) := {x ∈ Rm : x ≥ X}. If G is a positive definite symmetric matrix, then
V ∗ = πG
−1
O(X)(P ) (2.12)
where the projection πG
−1
O(X) : R
m → O(X) is taken under the inner product 〈x, y〉G
−1
:= xTG−1y.
(iii) If G is a K-matrix, then the affine game AG(X,P,G) has the WUC property and the Nash
equilibrium payoff V ∗ is also the unique value of the game.
Before establishing Theorem 2.1, we prove some auxiliary lemmas, which deal with the properties
of subgames.
Lemma 2.3. Let G be a real m ×m matrix with positive diagonal entries and non-zero principal
minors. If player m exercises in the game AG(X,P,G), then the subgame amongst the players in
M′ =M\{m} is given by AG(X−m, VM′(σ), G˜) where σ ∈ S corresponds to E(σ) = {m} and G˜ is
the (m− 1)× (m− 1) matrix defined by
G˜ij = Gij −
GimGmj
Gmm
, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m− 1. (2.13)
In particular, if sm = 0, then VM′ (s) = V˜ (s
−m) and aM′(s) = a˜(s
−m) where V˜ and a˜ are the
counterparts to V and a in the game AG(X−m, VM′(σ), G˜).
Proof. Recall that the payoff is given by V (s) = P + Ga(s). If m ∈ E(s), then player m exercises
and Vm(s) = Xm, so that the equality Xm = Pm +Gm·a(s) holds. After rearranging, we obtain
am(s) =
Xm − Pm −GmM′aM′(s)
Gmm
where M′ = M\ {m}. Consequently, we may represent the vector of payoffs for players from M′
as follows
VM′(s) = PM′ +GM′mam(s) +GM′M′aM′(s)
= PM′ +
GM′m
Gmm
(Xm − Pm) +
(
GM′M′ −
GM′mGmM′
Gmm
)
aM′(s)
= VM′(σ) +
(
GM′M′ −
GM′mGmM′
Gmm
)
aM′(s) (2.14)
where the strategy profile σ ∈ S corresponds to E(σ) = {m}. Note that we have used here the fact
that V (σ) = P + G·m(Gmm)
−1(Xm − Pm) is the vector of payoffs if only player m exercises. All
assertions can now be easily deduced from equation (2.14).
It was shown in Lemma 2.3 that if player m exercises, then the subgame between the remaining
players is an affine game associated with the matrix G˜. The next lemma demonstrates that the
matrix G˜ in fact retains the useful properties of G.
Lemma 2.4. Let G be a real m×m matrix such that Gmm 6= 0 and let the (m−1)× (m−1) matrix
G˜ be given by (2.13). Then:
(i) If G is a P-matrix, then G˜ is a P-matrix.
(ii) If G is a Z-matrix and Gmm > 0, then G˜ is a Z-matrix.
(iii) If G is a K-matrix, then G˜ is a K-matrix.
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Proof. (i) We construct the m×m matrix A by setting A =
(
G˜ GM′m
0 Gmm
)
or, more explicitly,
A =

G11 −
G1mGm1
Gmm
· · · G1(m−1) −
G1mGm(m−1)
Gmm
G1m
...
. . .
...
...
G(m−1)1 −
G(m−1)mGm1
Gmm
· · · G(m−1)(m−1) −
G(m−1)mGm(m−1)
Gmm
G(m−1)m
0 · · · 0 Gmm
.
It is clear that A can be obtained from G via the column operations A·j = G·j −
G·mGmj
Gmm
for
j = 1, . . . ,m− 1. Therefore, for any E ⊆ M with m ∈ E ,
det
(
GEE
)
= det
(
AEE
)
= Gmm det
(
G˜E\{m},E\{m}
)
.
Since Gmm > 0, the principal minors of G˜ must all be positive, as required. For part (ii), it suffices
to observe that, for i 6= j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m−1, we have that G˜ij = Gij−
GimGmj
Gmm
≤ Gij ≤ 0. Finally,
part (iii) is an immediate consequence of (i) and (ii).
Proof of Theorem 2.1. We first prove part (i). For any s ∈ S, we may write V (s) = P + Ga(s)
with (Vi(s)−Xi)ai(s) = 0 for all i ∈ M. We will now show that s is a Nash equilibrium whenever
Vi(s) ≥ Xi and ai(s) ≥ 0 for all i ∈M.
For any i /∈ E(s), if player i chooses to exercise instead, she should not be able to improve her
payoff if s was a Nash equilibrium, which in turn means that Vi(s) ≥ Xi. For any i ∈ E(s), we
consider the case where player i decides to not exercise; let the corresponding strategy profile be s′
so that E(s′) = E(s) \ {i}. Then
VE(s)(s)− VE(s)(s
′) = GE(s)E(s)
(
aE(s)(s)− aE(s)(s
′)
)
.
On the left-hand side, for j ∈ E(s), j 6= i, we have Vj(s) − Vj(s
′) = Xj −Xj = 0. Therefore, if we
solve for the ith component of aE(s)(s)− aE(s)(s
′) using Cramer’s rule, the expression can be easily
simplified to
ai(s)− ai(s
′) =
(Vi(s)− Vi(s′)) det(GE(s′)E(s′))
det(GE(s)E(s))
.
Recalling that ai(s
′) = 0 (because i /∈ E(s′)), we obtain
Vi(s)− Vi(s
′) =
det(GE(s)E(s))
det(GE(s′)E(s′))
ai(s).
Since G has positive principal minors, we conclude that Vi(s) ≥ Vi(s′) if and only if ai(s) ≥ 0.
We thus see that a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if and only if (z, w) = (a(s), V (s)−X) is
a solution to LCP(P −X,G). By Proposition 2.2, there is a unique solution pair (z∗, w∗). Therefore,
all Nash equilibria must attain the unique payoff value V ∗ = V (s∗) = w∗ +X and one such Nash
equilibrium s∗ is given by: s∗i = 0 if and only if w
∗
i = 0.
Part (ii) is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.3. Indeed, it suffices to translate the problem
by X to obtain the required result.
Let us now prove part (iii). We will prove the WUC property by induction on the number of
players. For two players, the WUC property is easy to check. Consider the case of m > 2 players.
We will compare the strategy profiles s and s′, where k ∈ E(s′) and E(s) = E(s′) \ {k}.
If E(s) = ∅, then for all l 6= k
Vl(s
′)− Vl(s) =
Glk
Gkk
(Xk − Pk) =
Glk
Gkk
(
Vk(s
′)− Vk(s)
)
.
It is clear that the WUC condition holds since Gkk > 0 ≥ Glk.
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If |E(s)| ≥ 1, by rearranging the player indices, we can assume, without loss of generality, that
m ∈ E ,m 6= k. Then, by Lemma 2.3, the game AG(X,P,G) can be reduced to the subgame
AG(X−m, VM′(σ), G˜) over the set of player M′ = M \ {m}, where G˜ is the (m − 1) × (m − 1)
matrix given by (2.13). Lemma 2.4 shows that G˜ is also a K-matrix. Therefore, by the induction
assumption, the subgame AG(X−m, VM′(σ), G˜) is WUC. In particular, Vl(s
′)−Vl(s) can be written
as a negative multiple of Vk(s
′)− Vk(s).
We conclude that the game AG(X,P,G) is WUC. It was shown by Kats and Thisse [20] that in a
WUC game, all Nash equilibria are also optimal equilibria. Since all K-matrices are also P-matrices,
by part (i), the game AG(X,P,G) must have an optimal equilibrium and hence a unique value.
3 Competitive Games with Singular Matrices
In the appendix, we analyze the connections between the affine game AG(X,P,D) and the general
redistribution game GRG(X,P, α) with
∑m
i=1 αi < 1, which was introduced in [8, 9]. Note, however,
that Definition 2.1 cannot be applied to the zero-sum redistribution game ZRG(X,P, α) examined
in [8, 9], since the corresponding matrix D̂ given by formula (6.1) is singular when
∑m
i=1 αi = 1.
This motivates us to extend Definition 2.1 of an affine game to cover also the case of a singular
matrix G.
Definition 3.1. Fix X,P ∈ Rm and let G ∈ Rm×m be a matrix with positive diagonal and non-
zero ‘proper’ principal minors (so det(G) = 0 is allowed). An m-player affine game AG(X,P,G)
is a single-period deterministic game in which each player i can choose either to exercise (si = 0)
or not exercise (si = 1). For any strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sm), the payoff vector V (s) =
(V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)) is given by, for every k ∈M,
Vi(s) =
{
Xi, i ∈ E(s),
Pi +GiE(s)
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s)), i /∈ E(s).
If a square matrix G is non-singular then Definition 3.1 is consistent with Definition 2.1. There-
fore, all the results established so far and regarding the game AG(X,P,G) with a non-singular
matrix G still apply. In this subsection, we will only focus on the case of a singular matrix G.
Definition 3.2. A square matrix M is called a P†-matrix if it has non-negative determinant and
positive proper principal minors. Furthermore M is said to be a K†-matrix if it is a P†-matrix as
well as a Z-matrix.
Remark 3.1. It is worth noting that the class P† of matrices is not identical to the well-known
classes of P0 and P1, which are defined as follows
(i) a P0-matrix is one with non-negative principal minors,
(ii) a P1-matrix is a P0-matrix where exactly one of the principal minors is zero.
Indeed, it is clear that we have the proper inclusions P†  P1 ∪ P  P0.
The following auxiliary result is borrowed from the monograph by Cottle et al. [1] (for part (i),
see Theorem 3.4.4; for part (ii), see Theorem 4.1.13).
Proposition 3.1. Assume that M is a P†-matrix. Then:
(i) For a fixed q ∈ Rm, if LCP(q,M) has at least one solution (z, w), then all solutions of LCP(q,M)
are unique in w.
(ii) If for some q ∈ Rm, LCP(q,M) does not have a solution, then there exists a fixed v ∈ Rm
satisfying
v > 0, vTM = 0,
such that LCP(q,M) has a solution if and only if vTq ≥ 0.
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The main result of this subsection is a counterpart of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.1. (i) If G is a P†-matrix, then AG(X,P,G) has a Nash equilibrium and a unique
Nash equilibrium payoff.
(ii) If G is a K†-matrix, then AG(X,P,G) is WUC and has a unique value.
Proof. (i) Let us first consider the case where LCP(P −X,G) has at least one solution. By Proposi-
tion 3.1(i), there exists a solution pair (z, w) where w is unique. The same argument as in Theorem
2.1 (used for P-matrices) can now be used to show that w is the unique Nash equilibrium payoff.
Assume now that LCP(P −X,G) does not have a solution. Then, by Proposition 3.1(ii), there
exists v > 0 such that vTG = 0 and vT(P −X) < 0. Consider the strategy profile s corresponding
to E(s) =M. We will show that s is in fact a Nash equilibrium.
To this end, it suffices to show that Xi ≥ Vi(s′) for all i ∈ M where s′ = (s−i, 1). Keep in mind
that for j 6= i, we have Vj(s′) = Xj . By Definition 3.1, since E(s′) = M\ {i} 6= M, we may write
V (s′) = P +Ga(s′) for some a(s′). Now
vT(P −X) = vT(V (s′)−Ga(s′)−X) = vT(V (s′)−X) = vi(Vi(s
′)−Xi).
Since vi > 0 and v
T(P −X) < 0, we must have Xi > Vi(s
′), as required.
(ii) The same argument from Theorem 2.1(iii) for K-matrices can be applied to K†-matrices.
3.1 Coalition Value in a Zero-Sum Game
So far, the definition of the value referred to each individual player. We will now consider the case
where a subset of players N ⊆ M is playing as a coalition, using the collective payoff VN (s) =∑
i∈N Vi(s). A natural way to define the value of the game for the coalition N is to set
V ∗N := sup
sN∈SN
inf
s−N∈S−N
VN (s
N , s−N ) = inf
s−N∈S−N
sup
sN∈SN
VN (s
N , s−N ), (3.1)
assuming, of course, that the second equality above holds. In general, the value does not necessarily
satisfy the additivity property V ∗N =
∑
i∈N V
∗
i . In the following preliminary result, we consider an
arbitrary m-person zero-sum game, that is, a game such that VM(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose the game is zero-sum and has an optimal equilibrium σ ∈ S with the
value V ∗ = V (σ). Then for any subset N ⊆M, the following equality holds
VN (σ) :=
∑
i∈N
V ∗i = V
∗
N .
Proof. Since σ is an optimal equilibrium, each player i ∈ M can guarantee the payoff Vi(σ); in other
words, Vi(σ) = infs−i∈S−i Vi(σ
i, s−i). Hence the players from N can ensure VN (σ) by collectively
choosing σN , since
VN (σ) =
∑
i∈N
inf
s−i∈S−i
Vi(σ
i, s−i) ≤
∑
i∈N
Vi(σ
N , s−N ) = VN (σ
N , s−N ), ∀ s−N ∈ S−N .
Consequently,
VN (σ) ≤ inf
s−N∈S−N
VN (σ
N , s−N ) ≤ sup
sN∈SN
inf
s−N∈S−N
VN (s
N , s−N ). (3.2)
If we apply the same argument to the player set −N , we see that they can also guarantee their
payoff V−N (σ),
V−N (σ) ≤ V−N (s
N , σ−N ), ∀ sN ∈ SN .
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Using the zero-sum condition, we obtain
VN (σ) = −V−N (σ) ≥ −V−N (s
N , σ−N ) = VN (s
N , σ−N ), ∀ sN ∈ SN , (3.3)
and thus
VN (σ) ≥ sup
sN∈SN
VN (s
N , σ−N ) ≥ inf
s−N∈S−N
sup
sN∈SN
VN (s
N , s−N ). (3.4)
By combining (3.2) and (3.4) with the well-known inequality
inf
s−N∈S−N
sup
sN∈SN
VN (s
N , s−N ) ≥ sup
sN∈SN
inf
s−N∈S−N
VN (s
N , s−N ),
we obtain the desired equality VN (σ) = V
∗
N .
3.2 Affine Games with Additive Values
In Theorems 2.1 and 3.1, we established the existence of the value for for each individual player in
the game AG(X,P,G) where G is a K†-matrix. As in the preceding subsection, we suppose that a
given subset of playersN ⊆M is playing as a coalition having in view the aggregated payoff function
VN (s) =
∑
i∈N Vi(s). Proposition 3.2 showed that in a zero-sum game with optimal equilibria, the
value V ∗N (in the sense of formula (3.1)) exists and satisfies the additive property V
∗
N =
∑
i∈N V
∗
i (s).
Although affine games are not necessarily zero-sum, we may introduce a dummy player to create a
zero-sum extended game. Then we may apply Proposition 3.2, in order to show that the additivity
property also holds for certain subclass of affine games.
Theorem 3.2. Consider the affine game AG(X,P,G) where X,P ∈ Rm and G is a K†-matrix.
Suppose that the column sums of G are non-negative, that is,∑
i∈M
Gij ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈ M. (3.5)
Then for any N ⊆M, the value V ∗N exists and is additive, in the sense that V
∗
N =
∑
i∈N V
∗
i .
Proof. In order to create a zero-sum extended game, we introduce a dummy player with index 0,
which has the terminal payoff P0 = −
∑
i∈M Pi and is not allowed to exercise. By convention, we
define her exercise payoff to be X0 = −
∑
i∈MXi and we denote
P˜ = (P0, P1, . . . , Pm), X˜ = (X0, X1, . . . , Xm).
By appending an extra row and column to G, we form the matrix G˜
G˜ =

0 −
∑m
i=1Gi1 · · · −
∑m
i=1Gim
0 G11 · · · G1m
...
...
. . .
...
0 Gm1 · · · Gmm
.
Note that since the dummy player has no right to exercise, the first column of G˜ is in fact irrelevant;
the column of 0s was chosen to simplify later arguments. From condition (3.5), we see that the
off-diagonal terms in G˜ are all non-positive and thus G˜ is a Z-matrix. We consider the extended
affine game AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) with the payoff function given by (of course, E(s) does not contain the
dummy player)
Vi(s) =
{
Xi, i ∈ E(s),
P˜i + G˜iE(s)
(
G˜E(s)E(s)
)−1
(X˜E(s) − P˜E(s)), i /∈ E(s).
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To see that AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) is a zero-sum game, it suffices to note that the vectors P˜ , X˜ as well
as the columns of G˜ lie in the subspace
{
x ∈ Rm+1 :
∑m
i=0 xi = 0
}
. It is also easy to see that for
players 1, . . . ,m, the payoff function of the extended game AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) is identical to the original
game AG(X,P,G). Therefore, we may set V˜0(s) = −
∑
i∈M Vi(s) for all s ∈ S.
Let s∗ be an optimal equilibrium of the original game AG(X,P,G). Since the dummy player
only has the action of ‘not exercising’, it is clear that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜).
In order to show that s∗ is also an optimal equilibrium of AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜), by the result of Kats and
Thisse [20], it suffices to show that AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) is WUC. Since G is a K†-matrix and the additional
entries in G˜ are non-positive, we may employ the same argument from Theorem 2.1(iii) to conclude
that AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜) is indeed WUC. Finally, since s∗ is an optimal equilibrium in the zero-sum game
AG(X˜, P˜ , G˜), the required result follows immediately from Proposition 3.2.
Remark 3.2. Lemma 6.1 in the appendix shows that the redistribution game GRG(X,P, α) (where
X,P, α ∈ Rm, a > 0 and
∑m
i=1 αi < 1) is equivalent to AG(X,P, D̂) where D̂ is given by (6.1). The
sum of column i in D is given by
αi −
m∑
j=1
αiαj = αi
(
1−
m∑
j=1
αj
)
≥ 0.
Consequently, by Theorem 3.2, the general redistribution game GRG(X,P, α) satisfies the additivity
property V ∗N =
∑
i∈N V
∗
i (s) for all N ⊆M.
4 Multi-Period Stochastic Affine Games
We will now extend the notion of a multi-period m-player redistribution game introduced in [9] (see
Definition 5.4 therein). We assume that we are given an underlying probability space (Ω,F ,P),
which is endowed with the filtration F = {Ft : t = 0, 1, . . . , T } representing the information flow.
For brevity, we hereafter write [t, T ] = {t, t+ 1, . . . , T }.
Definition 4.1. For each t = 0, 1, . . . , T , a stochastic multi-period competitive game with an affine
redistribution of payoffs, dubbed a stochastic affine game and denoted as SAGt(X,G), is defined on
the time interval [t, T ]. It is specified by the following inputs:
(a) the set of m players M = {1, 2, . . . ,m},
(b) the family of F-adapted processes Xt = (X
1
t , . . . , X
m
t ) for t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
(c) the m×m deterministic K†-matrix G,
and the following rules of the game:
(i) each player can exercise at any time in the interval [t, T ] and the game stops as soon as anyone
exercises; if no one exercises before T , then everyone must exercise at T ,
(ii) the strategy skt of player k is a random time chosen from the space S
k
t of F-stopping times with
values in [t, T ]; hence a strategy profile st = (s
1
t , . . . , s
m
t ) ∈ St is the m-tuple of F-stopping times,
(iii) for each strategy profile st ∈ St, the outcome of the game is the expected payoff vector Vt(st) =
(V 1t (st), . . . , V
m
t (st)), defined by
V kt (st) = EP
(
Xkŝt1{k∈E(st)} + X̂
k
ŝt1{k/∈E(st)}
∣∣Ft) (4.1)
where ŝt = s
1
t ∧ · · · ∧ s
m
t is the minimal stopping time and E(st) = {i ∈ M : s
i
t = ŝt} is the random
set of earliest stopping players; furthermore,
X̂kŝt = V
∗k
ŝt+1 +GkE(st)
(
GE(st)E(st)
)−1(
X
E(st)
ŝt
− V
∗E(st)
ŝt+1
)
, ŝt < T, (4.2)
where V ∗u = (V
∗1
u , . . . , V
∗m
u ) is the value of the game SAGu(X,G) for u = t+ 1, t+ 2, . . . , T .
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As the game is stopped at time ŝt, the indicator functions appearing in (4.1) are aimed to separate
the exercising players from the others: Xkŝt is the payoff for an exercising player, whereas X̂
k
ŝt
is the
payoff for a non-exercising player. Intuitively, the game SAGŝt+1(X,G) can be considered as the
continuation of the current game if it is not stopped at time ŝt. Note also that, in formula (4.2), the
term X̂kŝt is not defined for ŝt = T . This does not matter, however, because if the game is stopped
at T , then every player must exercise and receive XkT , so that X̂
k
T is irrelevant.
Remark 4.1. It is obvious that Definition 4.1 is in fact recursive. Since ŝt + 1 > t, the payoff of
SAGt(X,G) depends on the values of SAGt+1(X,G), . . . , SAGT (X,G), which can also be seen as
subgames of SAGt(X,G). It is also possible to view the multi-period game as a recursive sequence of
embedded single-period games. If the game SAGt(X,G) is stopped at t, then the exercising players
receive Xkt , while the other players receive
EP
(
V ∗kt+1 | Ft
)
+GkE
(
GEE
)−1(
XEt − EP
(
V ∗Et+1 | Ft
))
. (4.3)
If SAGt(X,G) is not stopped at time t, then it reduces to the game SAGt+1(X,G). And, finally,
the game SAGT (X,G) always stops at time T as everyone exercises.
Remark 4.2. The stopping game described by Definition 4.1 is perhaps not the most obvious
generalization of the single-period stochastic affine game. A more natural generalization would be
for the non-exercising player k to receive, for any st ∈ St,
Xk,T +GkE(st)
(
GE(st)E(st)
)−1(
X
E(st)
ŝt
−X
E(st)
T
)
, ŝt < T, (4.4)
when the game is stopped, that is, using X
E(st)
T instead of the value V
∗E(st)
ŝt+1
. However, even in
deterministic cases, this does not always produce optimal equilibria in pure strategies. For example,
let us consider a game with
X0 =
−1−1
0
, X1 =
−2−2
4
, X2 =
00
0
, G =
 2/9 −1/9 −1/9−1/9 2/9 −1/9
−1/9 −1/9 2/9
.
It is clear that player 3 will always want to exercise at time 1, while there is a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’
between players 1 and 2 at time 0. Then the game given by (4.4) with T = 1 has two Nash equilibria
(with different payoffs), but no optimal equilibria in pure strategies.
4.1 Optimal Equilibrium
For convenience, we introduce the following notation.
Definition 4.2. Suppose G is a P†-matrix and X,P ∈ Rm are given vectors. We denote by
SOL(X,P,G) the unique Nash equilibrium payoff of the single-period affine game AG(X,P,G).
The notation of SOL was originally used to denote the solution of a linear complementarity
problem. This is consistent with our usage, since SOL(X,P,G) is indeed the solution of LCP(P −
X,G) ifG is non-singular. IfG is singular, then LCP(P−X,G) may not have a solution. Nevertheless
we use SOL(X,P,G) to denote the Nash equilibrium payoff of AG(X,P,G), for convenience. So far,
we have used V ∗ when referring to SOL(X,P,G). But in the upcoming discussions, SOL(X,P,G)
is more appropriate, since it explicitly shows the dependence on X and P . In the special case of
G being a positive-definite symmetric matrix, we have the equality SOL(X,P,G) = πG
−1
O(X)(P ), as
demonstrated in Theorem 2.1.
At this moment, it is not clear that the game introduced in Definition 4.1 is well-defined, since
it is not yet known whether the game SAGt(X,G) always has a value. The following theorem shows
that this is indeed the case.
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Theorem 4.1. Let Xt = (X
1
t , . . . , X
m
t ) be F-adapted processes and G be a deterministic K
†-matrix.
Recursively define the Ft-measurable vector Ut = (U1t , . . . , U
m
t ) by setting UT := XT and
Ut := SOL
(
Xt,EP
(
Ut+1 | Ft
)
, G
)
, t = 0, 1, . . . , T. (4.5)
Define the F-stopping times τ∗t = (τ
∗1
t , . . . , τ
∗m
t ) by
τ∗it := inf
{
u ∈ [t, T ] : U iu = X
i
u
}
. (4.6)
Then the following statements are valid:
(i) the equality Ut = Vt(τ
∗
t ) holds for all t,
(ii) the strategy profile τ∗t is an optimal equilibrium of SAGt(X,G) and Ut = V
∗
t is the value.
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we will state an auxiliary lemma in which we
consider a single-period setting. We assume that we are given the F1-measurable random vectors
P = (P1, . . . , Pm) and X = (X1, . . . , Xm) and a deterministic m×m matrix G with non-zero proper
principal minors, that is, with det(GEE ) 6= 0 for all proper subsets E ⊂ M. In an m-player single-
period stochastic affine game AG(X,P,G) each player can only exercise at time 0 and the payoffs
are distributed at time 1. The space of strategy profiles is S =
∏
i∈M S
i where Si = {0, 1} is the
space of strategies for player i. For any s ∈ S, the outcome of the game is the expected payoff vector
V (s) = (V1(s), . . . , Vm(s)), defined by
Vi(s) = EP
(
Xi1{i∈E(s)} + X̂i1{i/∈E(s)}
)
where E(s) is the set of exercising players and
X̂i = Pi +GiE(s)
(
GE(s)E(s)
)−1(
XE(s) − PE(s)
)
.
By the linearity of the payoff function Vk(s), the stochastic game consider here is essentially equiv-
alent the deterministic affine game AG(EP(X),EP(P ), G). In view of Theorem 2.1, the proof of the
next lemma is straightforward and thus it is omitted.
Lemma 4.1. Consider the single-period stochastic affine game AG(X,P,G). Then:
(i) If G is a P†-matrix, then V ∗ = SOL
(
EP(X),EP(P )
)
is the unique Nash equilibria payoff and a
possible Nash equilibrium s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
m) is given by
s∗i = 0 ⇐⇒ SOL
(
EP(X),EP(P )
)
i
= EP(Xi).
(ii) If G is a positive definite symmetric matrix, then V ∗ = πG
−1
O(X)(EP(P )) where O(X) is the orthant
given by
O(X) :=
{
x ∈ Rm : xi ≥ EP(Xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
and the projection πG
−1
O(X) is taken under the inner product 〈x, y〉
G−1 = xTG−1y.
(iii) If G is a K†-matrix, then the game AG(X,P,G) is WUC. All Nash equilibria are also optimal
equilibria and V ∗ is also the unique value.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Throughout the proof, we will use the following properties:
(a) If the game SAGt(X,G) is stopped at time t, then the payoff function coincides with the single-
period affine game AG(Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G). This follows from Definition 4.1 and formula (4.3).
(b) If the game SAGt(X,G) is not stopped at time t under some strategy profile st ∈ St, then st is
also a strategy profile of SAGt+1(X,G), so that st ∈ St+1. Furthermore, by the definition of Vt(st)
in (4.1), the equality Vt(st) = EP(Vt+1(st) | Ft) holds.
(c) By (4.5)–(4.6) and Lemma 4.1, the F-stopping times τ∗t corresponds to an optimal equilibrium of
the single-period stochastic affine game AG(Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G) and Ut = SOL
(
Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G
)
is the corresponding value.
The statements (i) and (ii) will be established simultaneously by the backward induction. For
t = T , we have that τ∗T = (T, . . . , T ). The stochastic affine game SAGT (X,G) is always stopped at
18 Stochastic Multi-Player Competitive Games
time T with the payoff vector XT = UT = VT (τ
∗
T ) = V
∗
T also being the value. Let us now assume
both statements are true for the game SAGt+1(X,G), so its value is given by V
∗
t+1 = Ut+1.
We first prove part (i). Let us denote τ̂∗t = τ
∗1
t ∧ · · · ∧ τ
∗m
t . If τ̂
∗
t = t, the game is stopped at
time t. By (c), Ut is the payoff of τ
∗
t in AG(Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G). Since by the induction hypothesis
Ut+1 = V
∗
t+1, from property (a) it follows that Ut = Vt(τ
∗
t ).
If τ̂∗t ≥ t + 1, then the game is not stopped at time t. By the definition of τ
∗
t , we have that
U it > X
i
t for all i ∈ M. From property (c), we see that no one exercises in the optimal equilibrium
of AG(Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G) and thus Ut = EP(Ut+1 | Ft). Combining this with property (b) and the
induction hypothesis, we obtain
Ut = EP(Ut+1 | Ft) = EP(Vt+1(τ
∗
t ) | Ft) = Vt(τ
∗
t ).
We now proceed to the proof of part (ii). From part (i), we know that
Vt(τ
∗
t ) = Ut = SOL
(
Xt,EP(Ut+1 | Ft), G
)
= SOL
(
Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G
)
.
To check that τ∗t is an optimal equilibrium, we require for each k ∈M,
V kt (τ
∗k
t , s
−k
t ) ≥ SOL
(
Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G
)
k
≥ V kt (s
k
t , τ
∗,−k
t ), ∀ s
k
t ∈ S
k
t , ∀ s
−k
t ∈ S
−k
t . (4.7)
Let s′ = (τ∗kt , s
−k
t ), s
′′ = (skt , τ
∗,−k
t ) be alternative strategy profiles with the minimal stopping times
ŝ′t, ŝ
′′
t , respectively. We need to examine three cases.
Case 1: If ŝ′t = ŝ
′′
t = t, then, by property (a), both s
′
t and s
′′
t can be interpreted as strategy profiles of
the single-period affine game AG(Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G). Hence the validity (4.7) can be deduced from
property (c), because SOL
(
Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G
)
is the value of the game AG(Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G)
for player k.
Case 2: If ŝ′t ≥ t + 1, then, by property (b), we have that Vt(s
′
t) = EP(Vt+1(s
′
t) | Ft). By an
application of the induction hypothesis, we obtain
V kt (s
′
t) = EP
(
V kt+1(s
′
t)
∣∣Ft) ≥ EP(V ∗kt+1 ∣∣Ft).
Since τ∗kt ≥ t+ 1, property (c) tells us that player k does not exercise in the optimal equilibrium of
the game AG(Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G). Interpreting EP(V
∗k
t+1 | Ft) as the expected payoff of player k if
no one exercises, we have
SOL
(
Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G
)
k
≤ EP(V
∗k
t+1 | Ft) ≤ V
k
t (s
′
t),
as required.
Case 3: If ŝ′′t ≥ t + 1, then the argument is similar to Case 2. Again, by property (b) and the
induction hypothesis, we obtain
V kt (s
′′
t ) = EP
(
V kt+1(s
′′
t )
∣∣Ft) ≤ EP(V ∗kt+1 ∣∣Ft).
Since τ∗it ≥ t+ 1 for all i 6= k, property (c) tells us that none of the players from M\ {k} exercises
in the optimal equilibrium of the game AG(Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G). Interpreting EP(V
∗k
t+1 | Ft) as the
expected payoff of player k if no one exercises, we get
SOL
(
Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G
)
k
≥ EP(V
∗k
t+1 | Ft) ≥ V
k
t (s
′
t),
as required. We conclude that in all three cases, (4.7) is valid. Therefore, Ut is the value and τ
∗
t is
an optimal equilibrium of SAGt(X,G). ✷
4.2 Coalition Values
We have shown in Theorem 3.2 that under certain conditions on G in the affine game AG(X,P,G),
the value V ∗N for a coalition of players N ⊆M is additive, meaning that V
∗
N =
∑
i∈N V
∗
i . It is not
hard to generalize those arguments to the stochastic affine game SAGt(X,G).
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Theorem 4.2. Consider the multi-period stochastic affine game SAGt(X,G) where G is a K†-
matrix. Suppose that the column sums of G are non-negative, that is, condition (3.5) holds. Then
for any N ⊆M, the value V ∗Nt exists and
V ∗Nt = ess sup
sNt ∈S
N
t
ess inf
s−Nt ∈S
−N
t
V Nt (s
N
t , s
−N
t ) = ess inf
s−Nt ∈S
−N
t
ess sup
sNt ∈S
N
t
V Nt (s
N
t , s
−N
t ) =
∑
i∈N
V ∗it .
Proof. As in Theorem 3.2, we introduce the extended game with a dummy player with index 0, who
does nothing and has the payoff function V 0t (s) = −
∑
i∈M V
i
t (st) for all st ∈ St. Suppose that τ
∗
t is
an optimal equilibrium of SAGt(X,G). Our goal is to show that τ
∗
t is also an optimal equilibrium of
the extended game. Since the dummy player cannot make any choices, it is clear that τ∗t is a Nash
equilibrium of the extended game and has the optimal equilibrium property for players 1, 2, . . . ,m.
To check that τ∗t has also the optimal equilibrium property for the dummy player, it is enough
to show that V 0t (τ
∗
t ) = ess infst∈St V
0
t (st) or, equivalently,∑
i∈M
V it (τ
∗
t ) =
∑
i∈M
V ∗it = ess sup
st∈St
∑
i∈M
V it (st). (4.8)
We will establish (4.8) using the backward induction. For t = T , property (4.8) is trivially satisfied.
Let us now assume that it holds in the game SAGt+1(X,G), so that
EP
( ∑
i∈M
V ∗it+1
∣∣∣Ft) ≥ EP( ∑
i∈M
V it+1(st+1)
∣∣∣Ft) = ∑
i∈M
V it (st+1), ∀ st+1 ∈ St+1. (4.9)
For any particular st ∈ St, there are two cases to examine.
Case 1: On the event {ŝt = t}, we recall that the game on the time interval [t, t + 1] is equivalent
to the single-period affine game AG(Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G). In particular, its value is also given by
Vt(τ
∗
t ) = V
∗
t . From the proof of Theorem 3.2, since the matrix G satisfy the appropriate conditions,
the optimal equilibrium property is preserved with the addition of the dummy player. Therefore,
we must have ∑
i∈M
V it (τ
∗
t ) ≥
∑
i∈M
V it (st).
Case 2: On the event {ŝt ≥ t + 1}, a strategy profile st can also be seen as a strategy in St+1 and
thus the induction hypothesis (4.9) can be applied. Furthermore, since EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft) is the payoff
vector of the single-period affine game AG(Xt,EP(V
∗
t+1 | Ft), G) if no one exercises, using the same
argument as before and the induction hypothesis (4.9), we obtain∑
i∈M
V it (τ
∗
t ) ≥
∑
i∈M
EP(V
∗i
t+1 | Ft) ≥
∑
i∈M
V it (st).
In both cases, we have shown that the equality∑
i∈M
V it (τ
∗
t ) =
∑
i∈M
V it (st)
holds for all st ∈ St. Hence (4.8) is established and the induction is complete.
Remark 4.3. From the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, it is clear that is possible to further
generalize the game by making the matrix G time-dependent and F-adapted, so that we deal with a
matrix-valued process Gt, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, where with probability one the random matrix Gt(ω)
is a K†-matrix. In this version of the multi-period stochastic affine game, the payoff function would
be given by the following expression
V kt (st) = EP
(
Xkŝt1{k∈E(st)} + X̂
k
ŝt1{k/∈E(st)}
∣∣Ft)
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where
X̂kŝt = V
∗k
ŝt+1 +G
kE(st)
ŝt
(
G
E(st)E(st)
ŝt
)−1(
X
E(st)
ŝt
− V
∗E(st)
ŝt+1
)
, ŝt < T.
It is rather clear that if we adjust the definition of Ut by setting UT = XT and
Ut = SOL
(
Xt,EP
(
Ut+1
∣∣Ft), Gt), t = 0, 1, . . . , T,
then the proofs (and thus also the conclusions) of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 will still hold.
5 Reflected BSDEs for Stochastic Affine Games
In this final section, we briefly examine the relationships between multi-period affine games and
solutions to certain multi-dimensional reflected BSDEs.
5.1 A Class of Multi-Dimensional Reflected BSDEs
Let us first recall the properties of variational inequalities, which we will need in what follows. For
an in-depth analysis of variational inequalities, we refer to Facchinei and Pang [5] and Harker and
Pang [14].
Definition 5.1. Let D be a subset of Rm and F :D → Rm be a mapping. In the variational
inequality problem VI(D,F ), the goal is to find a vector z ∈ D such that
(F (z))T(y − z) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ D.
Typically, D is assumed to be closed and convex, while F is assumed to be continuous. If F is
an affine map F (z) = q+Mz, then VI(Rm+ , F ) is equivalent to LCP(q,M). For LCP(q,M), we have
seen in Proposition 2.2 that if M is a P-matrix, then the existence and uniqueness of solutions is
guaranteed. Similar existence and uniqueness results are also known for VI(D,F ). In particular,
Proposition 5.1 can be found in Harker and Pang [14].
Proposition 5.1. (i) Let D be a non-empty, closed, convex subset of Rm and let F :D → Rm be a
continuous mapping. If F is strongly monotone on D, that is, there exists c > 0 such that
(F (x)− F (y))T(x− y) ≥ c ‖x− y‖2, ∀x, y ∈ D, x 6= y,
then VI(D,F ) has a unique solution.
(ii) Let O be a rectangular region in Rm and let F :O → Rm be a continuous mapping. If F is a
uniform P-function on O, that is, there exists c > 0 such that
max
1≤i≤m
(Fi(x) − Fi(y))(xi − yi) ≥ c ‖x− y‖
2
, ∀x, y ∈ O, x 6= y,
then VI(O,F ) has a unique solution.
Let us introduce a particular class of multi-dimensional reflected BSDEs with solutions in a
rectangular region. Assume that we are given F-adapted, Rm-valued processes L and U satisfying
−∞ ≤ L ≤ U ≤ ∞ for i = 1, . . . ,m. Then the random rectangular region bounded by L and U is
given by, for t = 0, . . . , T ,
Ot =
{
(Y 1t , . . . , Y
m
t ) ∈ R
m : Lit ≤ Y
i
t ≤ U
i
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
where Y 1t , . . . , Y
m
t are Ft-measurable random variables.
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We consider the following m-dimensional reflected BSDE with the data (ξ, F,N, L, U,G)
Zt = ξ +
T−1∑
u=t
f(u, Zu, φu) + JT − Jt −
T−1∑
u=t
φu∆Nu+1 (5.1)
where
(i) N is an Rd-valued, (P,F)-martingale with the predictable representation property;
(ii) f is an F-adapted, Rm-valued random map;
(iii) G is an F-adapted, Rm-valued random map;
(iv) L and U are F-adapted Rm-valued processes with Li ≤ U i for i = 1, . . . ,m;
(v) ξ is an FT -measurable random variable in Rm with LiT ≤ ξ
i ≤ U iT for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Definition 5.2. A solution of the reflected BSDE (5.1) with data (ξ, F,N, L, U,G) is a triplet
(Z, φ, J) of processes such that:
(a) Z is an F-adapted, Rm-valued process such that equation (5.1) is satisfied for every t = 0, . . . , T ;
in particular, ZT = ξ,
(b) the condition Zt ∈ Ot holds for every t = 0, . . . , T ;
(c) φ is an F-adapted, Rm×d-valued process;
(d) J is an F-predictable, Rm-valued process satisfying
Jt =
t−1∑
u=0
G(u, Zu, φu,∆Ku+1) (5.2)
where the F-predictable, Rm-valued process K satisfies, for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
(∆Kt+1)
T(Z ′ − Zt) ≥ 0 ∀Z
′ ∈ Ot, (5.3)
where ∆Kt+1 := Kt+1 −Kt.
It is worth noting that one can replace (5.3) by
T−1∑
t=0
(1{Zt>Lt})
T∆K+t+1 =
T−1∑
t=0
(1{Zt<Ut})
T∆K−t+1 = 0
where ∆Ki+t+1 = ∆K
i
t+11{∆Kit+1>0}
and ∆Ki−t+1 = −∆K
i
t+11{∆Kit+1<0}
for each i = 1, . . . ,m.
Let us make some comments on the existence and uniqueness of a solution to BSDE (5.1).
Assume that the function G(t, z, y, k) has an inverse G−1t,z,y with respect to k. Then, using the
standard backward induction arguments, we may reduce the reflected BSDE from Definition 5.2
to the variational inequality problem VI(Ot, F ), where the mapping F is defined by the following
expression
F (z) := G−1t,z,φt(z − f(t, z, y)− p).
It is worth noting that here φt has already been computed from the induction step. In view of part
(i) in Proposition 5.1, it suffices to postulate that F is strongly monotone to guarantee the existence
and uniqueness of a solution. However, since the domain Ot is now a rectangular region, rather than
an arbitrary random convex subset of Rm, we may also use the weaker condition from part (ii) in
Proposition 5.1, that is, to assume that F is a uniform P-function.
5.2 Game Value as a Solution to the Reflected BSDE
The connection between two-player Dynkin games and doubly-reflected BSDEs is well known (see, for
instance, the seminal paper by Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [2]). We will now apply the multi-dimensional
reflected BSDE from the previous section to a multi-player stochastic affine game. In fact, the
full strength of this approach will only become clear when dealing with affine game options in a
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financial market model with frictions. In the present simple framework, the underlying martingale
N introduced in Definition 5.2 plays no essential role and thus it will be enough to consider the
reduced-form BSDE, as given by (5.4). In the financial applications, the martingale N is given in
advance, since it represents the discounted prices of traded assets, and the Rm×d-valued process φ
is interpreted as a collection of hedging strategies for m parties.
As shown in Section 2.1, the single-period affine game can be solved by focussing on a partic-
ular linear complementarity problem. Since linear complementarity problems are special cases of
variational inequalities, it is not surprising that the value process of the stochastic affine game can
be computed by solving a reflected BSDE stemming from the variational inequality. Let us thus
consider the m-player multi-period stochastic affine game SAG(X,G) introduced in Definition 4.1.
In particular, we restrict ourselves to the case of a (non-singular) K-matrix G, since linear comple-
mentarity problems with singular matrices may fail to possess a solution. Suppose that X is an
F-adapted, Rm-valued process and G ∈ Rm×m is a K-matrix. We now consider the reduced-form
reflected BSDE(X,G), which is formally obtained by setting f = 0 and ξ = XT in (5.1) and by
taking the conditional expectation with respect to Ft
ZT = XT , Zt − Jt+1 + Jt = EP(Zt+1 | Ft). (5.4)
We now specialize Definition 5.2 to the present situation where the mapping J is given by (5.5) and
the random orthant Ot is defined by, for t = 0, . . . , T ,
Ot =
{
(Y 1t , . . . , Y
m
t ) ∈ R
m : Y it ≥ X
i
t , 1 ≤ i ≤ m
}
where Y 1t , . . . , Y
m
t are Ft-measurable random variables.
Definition 5.3. A solution to the reflected BSDE (5.4) is a pair (Z, J) which satisfies:
(i) Z is an F-adapted, Rm-valued process satisfying Zt ∈ Ot,
(ii) J is an F-predictable, Rm-valued process satisfying
Jt =
t−1∑
u=0
G∆Ku+1 (5.5)
where K is an F-predictable, Rm-valued, non-decreasing process satisfying
T−1∑
t=0
(1{Zt>Xt})
T∆Kt+1 = 0.
The next lemma shows that the reflected BSDE(X,G) has a unique solution.
Lemma 5.1. The reflected BSDE(X,G) given by formula (5.4) has a unique solution pair (Z, J).
Moreover, the solution Z may be written as ZT = XT and, for all t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1,
Zt = SOL
(
Xt,EP(Zt+1 | Ft), G
)
. (5.6)
Proof. We apply standard backward induction arguments and we note that, for each t, we deal
with an Ft-measurable problem, which can be solved for each ω. It is thus clear that solving the
BSDE(X,G) over [t, t+ 1] reduces to the following deterministic problem
z −Gk = p, z ≥ x, k ≥ 0, 1{z>x}k = 0,
where z = Zt, k = ∆Kt+1, x = Xt. We observe that this problem is equivalent to LCP(p − x,G)
(or VI(Ot, F ) where F (z) = G
−1(z − p)). Since G is a K-matrix (and thus also P-matrix), by
Proposition 2.2, there exists a unique solution z.
For the last result, it suffices to combine Lemma 5.1 with Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 5.1. Let V ∗ be the value process of SAG(X,G) with a K-matrix G. Then V ∗ = Z where
the pair (Z, J) is the unique solution to the reflected BSDE(X,G).
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6 Appendix: Redistribution Games as Affine Games
The goal of the appendix is to re-examine a general redistribution game GRG(X,P, α), where α =
(α1, . . . , αm) with αi > 0 and
∑m
i=1 αi < 1, which was introduced in Section 3 of [9]. Our goal is to
show that such a game is a special case of an affine game given by Definition 2.1 with a non-singular
matrix G.
Let the matrix D̂ be given by the following expression
D̂ :=

α1 − α21 −α1α2 · · · −α1αm
−α2α1 α2 − α22 · · · −α2αm
...
...
. . .
...
−αmα1 −αmα2 · · · αm − α2m
. (6.1)
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Lemma 6.1. The general redistribution game GRG(X,P, α) is identical to the affine game AG(X,P, D̂).
Proof. One can check that the inverse D of D̂ is given by
D =
1
1−
∑m
i=1 αi

1 +
1−
∑
m
i=1 αi
α1
1 · · · 1
1 1 +
1−
∑m
i=1 αi
α2
· · · 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 · · · 1 +
1−
∑m
i=1 αi
αm
. (6.2)
Recall the payoff in AG(X,P, D̂) is given in Definition 2.1 as
V (s) = P + D̂·E(s)
(
D̂E(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s)).
The inverse
(
D̂E(s)E(s)
)−1
is similar to D, except it only contains αi where i ∈ E(s) and 1−
∑m
i=1 αi
is replaced by 1−
∑
i∈E(s) αi. It is clear that for i ∈ E(s), we have Vi(s) = Xi.
For k /∈ E(s), we obtain
Vk(s) = Pk + D̂kE(s)
(
D̂E(s)E(s)
)−1
(XE(s) − PE(s))
= Pk +
∑
i∈E(s)(−αkαi)
(
1−
∑
j∈E(s) αj
αi
(Xi − Pi) +
∑
j∈E(s)(Xj − Pj)
)
1−
∑
i∈E(s) αi
= Pk −
αk
1−
∑
i∈E(s) αi
((
1−
∑
j∈E(s)
αj
) ∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi) +
∑
i∈E(s)
αi
∑
j∈E(s)
(Xj − Pj)
)
= Pk −
αk
1−
∑
i∈E(s) αi
∑
i∈E(s)
(Xi − Pi).
Recall from [9] (see Assumption (A.1) therein) that the weights wk(E(s)) are given by the equality
wk(E(s)) =
αk
1−
∑
i∈E(s) αi
. Therefore, the payoff Vk(s) can be represented as follows
Vk(s) =
{
Xk, k ∈ E(s),
Pk − wk(E(s))
∑
i∈E(s)(Xi − Pi), k ∈ M \ E(s),
so that it matches the payoff function of GRG(X,P, α) (see Definition 5 in [9]).
We already know from Theorem 3.15 in [9] that a general redistribution game GRG(X,P, α) is
a WUC game with a unique value. To reaffirm these properties using Theorem 2.1(iii), it suffices to
show that the matrix D̂ of a general redistribution game is K-matrix.
Proposition 6.1. The matrix D̂ given by (6.1) is a K-matrix. The value V ∗ of GRG(X,P, α) =
AG(X,P, D̂) satisfies V ∗ = πD
O(X)(P ) where the projection π
D
O(X) : R
m → O(X) is taken under the
inner product 〈x, y〉D = xTDy given by
xTDy =
m∑
i=1
(
xiyi
αi
)
+
(
∑m
i=1 xi)(
∑m
i=1 yi)
1−
∑m
i=1 αi
. (6.3)
Proof. It is clear that D̂ is a Z-matrix because αi(1 − αi) > 0 and −αiαj < 0. To show that D̂ is
also a P-matrix, it suffices to check that det D̂ > 0, since its principal sub-matrices have the same
structure. Note that we can write det D̂ = det(I −B)
∏m
i=1 αi where B is given by
B :=

α1 α1 · · · α1
α2 α2 · · · α2
...
...
. . .
...
αm αm · · · αm
,
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so that B is a rank one matrix with a non-zero eigenvalue given by tr(B) =
∑m
i=1 αi. Hence the
characteristic polynomial of B is
det(λI −B) = λm−1
(
λ−
m∑
i=1
αi
)
.
By setting λ = 1, we obtain
det D̂ = det(I −B)
m∏
i=1
αi =
(
1−
m∑
i=1
αi
) m∏
i=1
αi > 0.
Therefore, D̂ is indeed a K-matrix. Since D̂ is symmetric, it is also positive definite. From Theorem
2.1(ii), we deduce that the value of GRG(X,P, α) = AG(X,P, D̂) can also be written as projection
under the inner product 〈x, y〉D = xTDy where D = D̂−1. It is easy to check that the inner product
〈x, y〉D is given by (6.3). As expected, this expression coincides with the inner product introduced
in [9] (see formula (3.11) therein) thus confirming also the projection results obtained in [9].
